Completing Kant's ethical approach

I am referring to the German philosopher Gerold Prauss (* 25 May 1936), who, in my opinion, has not only greatly improved Kant's ethics and made it plausible, but has also put together the most convincing ethics ever.

Prauss wants to give us an ethical standard that should become a guide for the common ongoing cultural history of all human beings, i.e. a cross-cultural standard for the present and the distant future.

The development of such a standard begins in the history of philosophy with Kant. Before Kant, one might say, there was no proper, or rather convincing, secular and at the same time objective ethics. But with his famous idea that a person should not be treated merely as a means to an end, but always as an end in itself, Kant succeeded in exerting a great influence on the secular movement of the European Enlightenment.

But Kant does not explain, Prauss argues, why human beings are identified with ends in themselves. According to Prauss, we should stop dealing with morality and law only from the perspective of the agent, as Kant does. The notion of an end in itself or self-end becomes much more understandable for morality and law when the objective perspective of an action is also taken into account, namely the perspective of the person being dealt with. Accordingly, morality and law are not “solipsistic” matters. Each is fundamentally a particular interpersonal relationship.

Kant thinks that the moral consists in treating someone both as an end and as a means, whereas evil consists in treating someone only as a means. But why not explain moral goodness in the intuitively more obvious way that it means treating someone only as an end, without any trace of treating that someone as a means?

Here is a quote that summarizes Prauss in this respect:

“The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between ‘not merely as a means, but at the same time as end’ and ‘not as means at all, but only as end’. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral.” (https://www.herder.de/thph/hefte/archiv/85-2010/2-2010/gerold-prauss-ueber-moral-und-recht-im-staat-nach-kant-und-hegel/)

According to Prauss – and this is the philosophical novelty – we can deal with people in three ways: 

1) only as a means, which would be the epitome of evil (e.g., lying, cheating, assault, grave insult, theft, robbery, and murder); 

2) both as a means and as an end in itself, which should characterize normal and legal dealings between people (in trade, shopping, at the hairdresser: the hairdresser as a means to a new haircut, the customer as a means to earn money etc.); so every everyday interaction in which a subject serves another subject for this or that purpose as this or that means. In these cases, it is guaranteed that a treated subject knowingly wants to be treated in this or that way by voluntarily undergoing such treatment, that is, that he or she wants it as an end in itself;

3) and finally, only as an end in itself, which would come into question when a person can no longer help herself – due to an accident, for example. One cannot simply pass by this person in need of help completely indifferent and unconcerned. For this person has the ability to understand herself as a free creator of goals, which in turn leads to the fact that she can (consciously) make herself an end in herself and thus automatically an end for/to all other people. An end in itself is simply an end in itself, I can't ignore that. It alone is an objective and thus normative value. And only the capacity for self-knowledge makes something an end in itself. Hence, such an end in itself can only be a subjectivity that knows or can know about itself.

A demand is made by the injured person to the person present, who can no longer evade this demand without moving to the moral sidelines. The demand need not be articulated. It only has to be accepted as a possibility or a potential. The person present is then de facto morally obliged to help. And this helping is the morally good (and required) action in that particular situation. Prauss takes the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan as a prime example of a morally good deed.

Thus, if we fail to help someone in need, we not only show ourselves to be lacking in merit, but we also commit an evil. The duties of virtue, then, are not to be regarded as some sort of moral luxury that we might neglect.

As long as or to the extent that a subject is not able to help itself, it cannot be in a position to knowingly and willingly make itself this or that means for another subject, and therefore to enter into such a legal relationship with another subject of its accord. It only remains as an end in itself, so to speak.

Prauss succeeds in establishing self-knowledge (the ability to understand oneself as an end in itself and thus to make oneself an end in itself) and interpersonality or intersubjectivity as the cornerstones of ethics.

Therefore, there can be no moral or legal relationship with either a stone or a fly. Neither the stone nor the fly are ends in themselves, they cannot make themselves an end, which only a reflective consciousness can make possible.

We usually have no problem killing a fly. 

However, if the living fly were to magically attain self-knowledge and reflective consciousness, and thereby become a conscious and knowing end in itself, then we as humans would have trouble and reservations about killing that particular fly. Because the fly would have the potential to somehow signal to humans that it does not want to be killed.

You intuitively have a desire to do justice to ends in themselves. You naturally want to serve ends. There is no such desire when it comes to a large stone or an injured fly. Because they cannot be ends in themselves, and therefore cannot communicate it.

Precisely because a human subject in this sense is an end in itself, it must be considered the epitome of evil to treat such a personal subject only as a means, that is, against its knowing will.

At least one knows from oneself what it means to be an end in oneself. One is one's own binding standard for oneself. If an end in itself is also given outside oneself, then it has the same scope and normativity as for oneself. And how do I know that there are ends in themselves outside myself? Intersubjectivity. Others are able to make demands on me where they themselves are in a sense the guideline.

Morality, according to Prauss, is not something that exists fixed and predetermined in some ontological third realm, but arises spontaneously yet objectively in encounters between rational beings as a relation.

Each of us is a potential knowing/conscious will or a knowing/conscious end in itself. And since everyone knows this about him/herself as well as about all others, he/she is also a knowing/conscious demand, a knowing/conscious claim against all others, for whom this must therefore become an obligation. For everyone who is in this sense a conscious end in itself wants to be treated as such by everyone else: at least also as an end in itself, or even only as an end in itself, depending on whether he/she can help him/herself or not. In short, rational agents (can) issue imperatives all the time. But only in certain interpersonal contexts do these imperatives give rise to objectively binding moral or legal obligations. The ability to help oneself is the crucial moral criterion.

Prauss provides a plausible derivation of the practical ought:

A practical ought can only be derived from a will, to be more precise, from another will, a will other than one's own. The other will is to be understood as a (potential) request, claim, demand, or command, which only another (rational) person can make:

“To get an absolute command (or ‘categorical imperative’ [...]) you have to presuppose someone who gives that command.” (Thompson, Mel. Understand Ethics: Teach Yourself: Making Sense of the Morals of Everyday Living)

As Prauss is German, his argument comes from the logic and semantics of the German verb sollen, which translates into English as “ought” or “should”. Almost all German grammars explain sollen by saying that there must be another personal agent who wants something from you (who insists that you do something). I think German is more precise and clearer in this case than English. So if A ought to do X, this implies that someone wants A to do X. For example, I go to the doctor, and he tells me to take two pills twice a day. Later, I tell my wife that I ought to take two pills twice a day.

The ethical question that now arises is, how can I distinguish a morally binding ought from a morally non-binding one? Because not everything that people ask me to do is really binding.

As Prauss says, I can recognize the morally obligatory ought by the criterion of whether the other person is still able to help herself. When it's potentially a matter of life and death, you have to get involved. The moral ought is always binding when the other person is certain to die soon without immediate help. And the injured person's claim cannot go beyond her injury and therefore beyond restoring her normal wellbeing.

What does this logic of action look like in an idealized form? The first step would be something like this: For example, a person asks me for help by turning to me and saying, 'Help me, please', which means, 'I want you to help me.' Of course, I immediately understand that I should help her. So, we have moved from the will/demand of another person to a should/ought arising in my mind. I have to translate someone else's will into an ought for myself.

In a less ideal case, where the person can no longer speak, I can still reasonably assume that the injured person is an end in itself. The injured person may be able to send me an imperative to help, and would do so if she could. She has the capacity to do so anyway, and this is morally binding.

Without the additional presence of a rational being facing me, there is simply no ought possible, let alone a moral one. In fact, a possible conscious demand by another person is the essential condition for the realization of an ought in my mind.

So, there is a way of deriving an ought, namely from the self-recognized will of someone else (it is also clear that the human will is always conscious, but not always self-aware). And I think that's the only way to get an ought.

This is how Prauss sums it up, as I translated it with a web translator:

“And it is obvious that such an “ought” is therefore nothing but the synthetic result of the encounter of subjects, each of whom, as a conscious end in itself, is a conscious willing in relation to the other, and thus also a conscious demanding.” (Gerold Prauss - Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel, Morality and Law in the State after Kant and Hegel)

There is also another normativity, from which comes a pressure to act, which presupposes one's own personal will. I'll give an example: I want to be home at ten o'clock in the evening, so I must (normative must or have to) get on the bus at half past nine.

So if you want y to happen, then you must do x, provided you really want it to happen. There must be a strong interest in what is wanted or willed, and not just a desire or wish. But this must is not moral.

Here is another description using the example of the doctrine of karma:

“In Eastern philosophy, the idea of karma – that actions have consequences that cumulatively influence the future – relates the state of the world to moral choices. But this gives only a ‘hypothetical’ command (in other words, one that says ‘If you want to achieve X, then you must do Y’), not an absolute moral command.” (Thompson, Mel. Understand Ethics: Teach Yourself: Making Sense of the Morals of Everyday Living)

According to Prauss, there is (1) a legal and moral normativity that comes about through another person, and (2) a purely logical normativity that I have towards myself. In other words, according to Prauss, contrary to Kant, there is no (direct) moral self-duty or moral duty towards oneself. Strictly speaking, moral normativity also requires logical normativity. But explaining this would go too far. 

As a further aid to understanding:

Pavlos Kontos summarises Prauss in a review (Kant-Studien 2009). I hope the passages are somewhat comprehensible:

“The author [Prauss] draws inspiration from an extremely challenging idea, according to which we should abandon the Kantian triple distinction between actions ‘from duty’, ‘contrary to duty’, and ‘according to duty’, and substitute for it another triple schema which, whilst formulated in Kantian terms, has not been acknowledged as such by Kant, namely the schema: ‘only as a means’, ‘not “only” as a means but “also” as an end in itself’, and ‘not only “also” as an end in itself, but “only” as an end in itself’. Needless to say, the brilliance of this original reconstruction is principally owed to the introduction of this third pure alternative that Kant, and even the whole Kantian literature, has neglected.”

“As a matter of fact, it is more or less eagerly conceded that the Kantian distinction between actions ‘from duty’, ‘contrary to duty’, and ‘according to duty’ is a puzzling one. However, Prauss’ analysis is much more elegant and resolute (699ff.). The terms ‘from’, ‘according to’ and ‘contrary to’ are disapproved of to the extent that they are formally-logically dependent upon what follows them, that is, upon the notion of duty; furthermore, they are not mutually exclusive since, for example, an action which is not contrary to duty might be either ‘according to’ or ‘from’ duty. The apogee of these perplexities is that the categorical imperative of humanity will equate morality and right, by grounding both of these realms on the obligation to “use humanity […] always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Groundwork, 4: 429). Consequently, Prauss is entitled to state: “to confuse morality for right is a catastrophe” (707)!”

“The very case of an action that handles another person ‘only as an end in himself’ is [...] meant to exclusively define what morality is about; by contrast, the order of right emerges once we encounter other persons at the same time as means and as ends in themselves. These two real practical alternatives describe the difference between moral good and right (morally and rightly good), whence the negative alternative of handling someone ‘only as a means’ mirrors what is morally and rightly evil.

Prauss proceeds by dealing with the exclusively moral alternative, that is, with an action that handles other persons only as ends in themselves. It proves to be the case that this action, and hence the order of morality in general, is conditioned by a very peculiar situation: a claim to morality is grounded only “when the person handled is precisely not in a position to help himself and as long as he remains in this position” (711). “This self-help represents then the decisive criterion” in order for the realms of right and morality to be distinguished from one another and, consequently, this very distinction depends upon the emergence of such a particular case (711f., note). The rationale of the argument suggests that whoever cannot assure his own life cannot therefore represent a means for our subjective purposes (1117f.).

[…]

Morality emerges as a relation between an actor (able to help himself and others) and a person in need or, according to the Samaritan example, a “verwundetes [wounded, injured] Subjekt” (1111f.).

Thus, Prauss is obliged to subscribe to two further claims: in addition to the claim that there is no morality possible between persons who are not in need, there is no morality possible between persons in need, since they have nothing to offer or, in the terms that the author will later introduce, they can give no life (not even to themselves). Hence, morality is conditioned by situations that are exclusively restricted to interpersonal relations between non-injured and injured persons.

[…]

Prauss reconstructs the notion of ends in a long argument that we might reformulate as follows: Human will is not auto-referential but by essence directed to the success (and not to the failure) of the actions in which it is implicated. Due to this intentionality, good and evil are attributes we ascribe to actions, insofar as they respect the normativity (whatever its kind might be) that the agent has adopted and thereby freely ‘incorporated’ as his actual incentive (759). Every kind of normativity presupposes a claim raised by the Behandelte [patient being treated, being acted upon] (that is, stemming from the objective side of action) and a kind of Befolgung [observance] (that is, the readiness of the agent to act according to the principles he has subscribed to).

[…]

Freedom bears practical relevance only insofar as it represents the object of conscience: normativity presupposes the knowledge of freedom, not just freedom itself (799). However, this factual knowledge is not sufficient to explain why human beings are regarded as ends in themselves. Thus, a second level of self-recognition is required, namely a level grounded upon a further fact: upon the fact that human beings, bestowed as they are with Vernunft [reason] and not simply with Verstand [understanding], achieve a thematization of their conscience of freedom (840). Hence, Vernunft makes possible a self-knowledge, i.e. a self-recognition, of human beings as free creators of ends, namely, as self-creators (817). It follows that the first kind of causality recognized by a human being bestowed with Vernunft is free causality as the vehicle of his selfrealization. It is only afterwards that a human being recognizes that other beings might also operate as causes, either as natural causes or even as free animals and human subjects. Prauss’ conclusion thus leaves no mystery: “free causality constitutes from the outset the necessary precondition of natural causality” (865). The synthesis of freedom (self-realizing will) and necessity (the claims raised by others), conditioned as it is by this mutual dependence of the two aforementioned facts upon one another, admits of three modalities: ‘to be only as a means’, ‘to be not only as a means but also as an end in itself’, and ‘to be not only also as an end, but only as an end in itself’. If one replaces being with will-to-live, he easily concludes that this synthesis allows for three modalities of action: “only life-to-take”, “not only life-to-take but also life-to-give”, and “only life-to-give” (1099). And if one further substitutes time for life (by which Prauss means Geistesleben [mind life]), he will realize why these three modalities are not susceptible to any quantitative approach, since life-time can neither be augmented nor be re-gained and exchanged in any possible way, assuming that time is adequately apprehended as life-time [...]. Precisely because lifetime resists any quantitative approach, good and evil are categories proper to morality and right; that is to say, they are independent of any reference to goals evaluated according to the categories of utility. Hence, to ground morality and right on mere facts by emphasizing their formal (transcendental) implications is tantamount to resisting utilitarianism. Within transcendental philosophy, self-realization and inter-personality (although they represent mere facts and, qua facts, they resist any eventual reduction to further grounds) constitute both the ontological ground and the “Sinn [sense] of morality and right” (1089).

[…]

Morality and right [...] represent a game that we are factually obliged to play, given the facts of self-knowledge and interpersonality; good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beings and are evaluated in light of their impact upon the lifetime of these human beings and, hence, morality and right do not dwell within our internal maxims or intentions.”

Possible objections and rejoinders:

Moral dilemmas are proof that a categorical imperative does not exist:

"You are an eyewitness to a crime: A man has robbed a bank, but instead of keeping the money for himself, he donates it to a poor orphanage that can now afford to feed, clothe, and care for its children. You know who committed the crime. If you go to the authorities with the information, there's a good chance the money will be returned to the bank, leaving a lot of kids in need. What do you do?" (https://www.buzzfeed.com/tracyclayton/moral-dilemmas-that-will-break-your-brain)

This is a pretty rotten situation because you would have to take the bread from the mouths of little children due to your "categorical imperative" that you say exists.

You are walking by a woman who needs help so you are obligated to help her? Hmm, what if you help her but the next day there is another woman laying on the side of the road needing help? And you help her as well? And the next day there is another woman, and everyday for the rest of your life there will be a woman on the side of the road that needs your help?

Eventually you are going stay inside the house for a day, because you simply do not feel like helping whatever woman will be on the side of the road that day. Are you morally obligated to go outside that day? I mean, you've already helped 20 women for the past 20 days in a row, you have the energy to do it for a 21st day, but you are not morally obligated to do it. But the reason you are not morally obligated does not come from the fact that you previously helped women 20 days in a row. You do not have a moral obligation on the 21st day just as you do not have a moral obligation on the first day.

In principle, Prauss denies that there can be a categorical imperative in the strict sense. Prauss's moral imperative is conditioned on a situation where there is someone who is unable to help themselves.

The imperative I am referring to would demand that the money be returned to the bank and that the children be saved from starvation. Yes, both. The bank employees were only used as a means, which is immoral, and not helping the children, who should only be treated as an end, is equally immoral. Of course, it is legitimate to ask who is now called upon to help the children. This may not be easy to determine, but the basic idea that the children must be helped in the first place remains unaffected. If I, as a European, hear about starving children in Africa, do I have an immediate obligation to help? Is it a question of proximity or the means and tools to help? Am I being addressed as an individual or as a collective with others, etc.? These are all legitimate questions, but, as I said, they do not undermine the core of Prauss's concept.

You cannot deny that imperatives (obligations) exist in general. If I ask you to go for a walk or whatnot, I have created an imperative addressed to you. You won't deny that? So, there are, what you can't deny, imperatives. The question is only whether there are morally binding ones. I would say that people's being an end in themselves is a good criterion for there to be some. The idea of an end in itself is what we understand as objective value.

The second example is not a challenge to Prauss's ethics either. After all, it's enough if I always call the ambulance or the emergency services, and that's no big deal. I think the idea is that you have to help to the best of your ability. There is a personal assessment where you have to avoid self-deception. So help to the best of your knowledge and conscience. And just a phone call may be the only sensible thing to do.

If I leave my house and always meet (notice, become aware of) a person in need, then I am indeed obliged to help. Perhaps there is a reason why there are always people in need near my house, then I might be obliged to investigate, to prevent it, to contact the authorities, to encourage other people to help.

Why should I be forced to leave my house the next day? Why should I assume that another person needs help? There are no obligations. I do not see the objection. There would have to be a reason, as I said, that people are always in need. I would have to counteract that reason as best I can and as far as I am able.

I have to know that someone is in need, and that was the case on the first day I left the house. But why should I assume that on the 21st day, I would have to leave the house to help? The fact that people were in need was a fortuitous and accidental circumstance. And if it is certain that there will always be people in need, then they cannot demand that I sacrifice myself for them like a saint and lay down my life for them. For holiness goes beyond what Prauss understands by morality. To avoid misunderstandings. I mean that one literally dies for the other, as in martyrdom. Because, in a certain sense, with Prauss you have to sacrifice something of yourself. Namely, your own precious lifetime.

If we take everyday life as a starting point and leave aside the extravagant, purely invented examples, then I don't see the big problem.

You only need to help if you notice that someone you meet is in need. But you're right in the sense that when you watch the news, for example, you hear about people all over the world who need help. What happens then? Am I called to help personally? Or is it enough for me to donate because aid organizations are already there? Or do I have the right to be lazy and do nothing?

What if a person wants to commit suicide? Are they evil for not staying alive to help someone else? What if they are on their deathbed? Should they be setting their priorities to try to live and help others at the same time?

There is no morality possible between people in need, since they have nothing to offer.

Every single person on this planet needs help.

Though Prauss would say that, in a sense, most are still capable of self-help, but I agree that one can argue about what exactly that means. However, as long as self-help power is given, there is not the slightest reason to go beyond the minimum of care. The minimum is characterized both by treating the other as consensual means and by treating the other as end.

All suffering is not equal. Some people think they are always in pain or suffering and their life is considerably better than other people who are suffering terribly but make sure to try and be happy and make the best out of life.

Agreed. Prauss uses only one example for his moral theory, that of the biblical Samaritan. And this example seems clearer. A person is down and if she doesn't get help quickly, she will die. All other cases are then a matter of weighing and evaluating and balancing.

One could say that Prauss's theory represents a kind of Patient-Centered Deontological Theory:

“All patient-centered deontological theories are properly characterized as theories premised on people’s rights. An illustrative version posits, as its core right, the right against being used only as means for producing good consequences without one’s consent. Such a core right is not to be confused with more discrete rights, such as the right against being killed, or being killed intentionally. It is a right against being used by another for the user’s or others’ benefit.”

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/#PatCenDeoThe