Critique of Edward Feser's Last Superstition

Critique of Edward Feser's "The Last Superstition": Attitude, Presentation, and Philosophical Integrity

Edward Feser's book, The Last Superstition, presents a defense of Thomistic philosophy against the arguments of the New Atheists. However, the author's approach is characterized by intense passion, evident frustration, and a strongly conservative Catholic perspective. This results in a work that functions more as a one-sided polemic than as a balanced philosophical engagement. Rather than fostering a sober dialogue between Aquinas's ideas—which may not be widely familiar—and contemporary atheist positions, the book employs manipulative rhetoric that undermines its scholarly potential.

Feser's polemical style does not advance the discussion effectively. In contrast, Thomas Aquinas demonstrated restraint by portraying opposing views in their strongest form, avoiding ridicule regardless of merit. It is regrettable that Feser aligns himself with the very confrontational tactics he criticizes in the New Atheists, thereby mirroring behaviors he deems immature.

Recommendations for Readers

This book is not advisable for those with only superficial knowledge of philosophy. Prospective readers should first familiarize themselves with the history of philosophical debates spanning nearly three millennia. Additionally, exposure to alternative metaphysical systems and works by prominent atheists and agnostics would provide necessary context. Notable examples include Walter A. Kaufmann (Critique of Religion and Philosophy, The Faith of a Heretic), Kai Nielsen (Atheism and Philosophy), William L. Rowe (Can God Be Free?, The Cosmological Argument), J. L. Schellenberg (The Hiddenness Argument), John Leslie Mackie (The Miracle of Theism), Nicholas Everitt (The Non-Existence of God), Theodore Drange (Nonbelief & Evil), Michael Martin (Atheism: A Philosophical Justification), Graham Oppy (The Best Argument Against God, Arguing about Gods), Jordan Howard Sobel (Logic and Theism), and Anthony Kenny (The Five Ways, The Unknown God, The God of the Philosophers), an agnostic expert on Aquinas.

Feser is an articulate writer whose confident and engaging prose can persuade through selective omission, rhetorical sophistication, and other persuasive techniques. Philosophically inexperienced secular readers may be unduly influenced, potentially leading to intellectual discomfort.


Underlying Issues in Feser's Approach

A key concern is Feser's blend of an ostensibly academic style with vague or unsubstantiated claims. His interpretations of philosophical history, such as those concerning Aristotle, often lack depth and do not withstand expert scrutiny. Ultimately, Feser's primary objective appears to be promoting Catholicism, which shapes his argumentative strategy.

To illustrate, consider three examples of his manipulative techniques (among many others):

Representation of Plato: Feser praises Plato as the originator of conceptual ideas accessible through reason. However, he omits Plato's view that comprehending these ideas transcends pure rationality, requiring a mystical element that introduces irrationality. This selective portrayal preserves an unblemished rationalist narrative, avoiding any historical inconsistencies in his framework.



Shift from Platonic Realism to Aristotelian Universals: Early in the book, Feser defends strong Platonic realism with robust arguments, only to later qualify it in favor of Aristotle's theory of universals. Aristotle himself dismissed Platonic Forms as irrelevant, stating in Posterior Analytics (83A32–34): "Farewell to the [Platonic] Forms: they are but ding-a-lings and even if they do exist they are wholly irrelevant." Feser positions Platonic realism as a reasonable starting point needing minimal adjustment, while vilifying nominalism as antithetical to his project. He could have begun from nominalism and progressed to Aristotle, but this might not align with his agenda, especially given that some nominalists draw support from Aristotle.


Theories of Laws of Nature:

In discussing physical laws, Feser frames the debate as a binary choice between a neo-Aristotelian powers-based theory and Hume's regularity theory, favoring the former while disparaging the latter. He neglects the prevalent Platonic perspective, which views laws as eternal mathematical ideas underlying reality. As Rupert Sheldrake outlines in The Science Delusion, figures like Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Newton, Hertz, Einstein, Eddington, Jeans, and Heisenberg adopted Platonic or Pythagorean views, positing that the universe is governed by immutable mathematical structures. Modern theorists like Max Tegmark extend this to "radical Platonism," where all mathematical possibilities exist physically. Feser also omits Plato's Timaeus, which describes matter as composed of geometrical solids built from elementary triangles (as summarized by S. Marc Cohen). This omission steers readers toward an Aristotelian conception of God, discouraging exploration of Platonic alternatives that may not require a deity.

Many Platonic physicists envision a realm of abstract entities with inherent efficacy, independent of a personal God.


Positive Contributions

Credit is due to Feser for highlighting enduring philosophical questions, such as the problem of universals (as truthmakers for property attributions) and teleology, which demand serious consideration from philosophers and scientists alike.
Overextension of Reason and Interpretive Errors

Feser asserts that his arguments rely solely on reason, eschewing faith or religious authority. He claims reason proves God's existence, human immortality, the possibility of miracles like resurrection, and even the Trinity. As Anthony Kenny notes in his review, this expands reason's scope beyond what Aquinas himself endorsed. Many of Feser's theological inferences are non-sequiturs, with questionable premises.

As a Thomist, Feser should command a thorough understanding of Aristotle. Yet, he errs in critiquing modern secularists for recognizing only local motion as change, contrasting it with Aristotle's broader categories. He cites water becoming hotter or colder as quantitative change, but this exemplifies qualitative change per Aristotle (alteration in properties), not quantitative (change in size or amount). While temperature can be quantified, this does not redefine the category; water's expansion upon heating is incidental. Feser also fails to mention Aristotle's Physics, where all changes reduce to local motion as primary, aligning somewhat with mechanistic views he criticizes. He overlooks modern physics' departure from strict mechanism.

Finally, Feser condemns secularists for ignoring Platonic and Aristotelian forms as the basis of morality, linking this to practices like abortion. However, Plato and Aristotle themselves condoned infanticide under certain conditions, such as deformities. If the originators of these concepts did not deem such acts inherently wrong, it is inconsistent to fault contemporary secularists—whom Feser views as metaphysically limited—for similar positions. This weakens the justification for his indignation.

Critique of Edward Feser's Theodicy and Views on Universal Salvation

Edward Feser's The Last Superstition presents a defense of Catholic theology, but his arguments, particularly concerning the problem of evil and the concept of hell, raise significant concerns about intellectual honesty and theological coherence. This critique examines Feser's approach to suffering, salvation, and the moral implications of Catholic doctrine, highlighting inconsistencies and selective omissions in his presentation.


Feser's Theodicy and the Problem of Suffering

In addressing the problem of evil, Feser asserts that the suffering endured in this life is ultimately outweighed by the eternal bliss of the beatific vision in the hereafter. He writes:

[T]here is every reason to think that God can and will bring out of the sufferings of this life a good that so overshadows them that this life will be seen in retrospect to have been worth it. (Edward Feser)

And further:

Indeed, even the greatest horror we can imagine in this life pales in insignificance before the beatific vision. (Edward Feser)

This perspective suggests that even extreme suffering, such as that experienced by Holocaust victims at Auschwitz, serves a divine purpose and is compensated by eternal reward. However, Feser, as a Catholic theologian, omits a critical aspect of traditional Catholic doctrine: salvation is not guaranteed by suffering alone. According to the Council of Florence (1442), the Catholic Church historically taught:

[The Holy Roman Church] firmly believes, professes and preaches, that none who are outside the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and schismatics, can partake of eternal life, but they will go into eternal fire… unless before the end of life they will have been joined to [the Church]… ‘No one, howsoever much almsgiving he has done, even if he sheds his blood for Christ, can be saved, unless he remains in the bosom and unity of the Catholic Church.’

This doctrine implies that non-Catholics, including Jewish victims of the Holocaust, would not automatically qualify for heavenly reward, potentially facing eternal damnation. Feser's failure to acknowledge this undermines his theodicy, as it leaves open the possibility that immense suffering may lead not to salvation but to eternal punishment, contradicting his optimistic claims.

Moreover, Feser's universalist tone—that suffering universally leads to heavenly reward—clashes with Catholic dogma, which emphasizes the necessity of faith and adherence to the Church. If he endorses universal salvation, his theodicy holds; if he adheres to traditional doctrine, it collapses, as salvation is not guaranteed for all who suffer.


The Moral Implications of Hell and Procreation

Feser's advocacy for procreation as a moral duty, grounded in natural law, raises further ethical questions. He argues that human nature, as designed by God, obligates individuals to produce offspring. However, this stance is problematic when considered alongside the Catholic doctrine of hell. By bringing children into the world, parents expose them to the risk of eternal damnation, a fate beyond parental control, as children may later reject the Catholic faith. Feser describes modern society as a "stinking cesspool of wickedness and irrationality," suggesting a high likelihood of moral and spiritual decline, which increases the risk of apostasy.

Augustine, a key figure in Catholic theology, held that even devout Christians cannot be certain of salvation, and the majority may face damnation. Mortal sins, such as unconfessed masturbation, contraception, or minor transgressions, can lead to hell if absolution is not received before death. This precarious spiritual landscape makes procreation a morally fraught act, as it subjects children to a perilous eternal outcome.


David Bentley Hart articulates this concern:

If [a Catholic philosopher] truly thought that our situation in this world were as horribly perilous as he claims… he would never dare to bring a child into this world, let alone five children; nor would he be able to rest even for a moment, because he would be driven ceaselessly around the world in a desperate frenzy of evangelism, seeking to save as many souls from the eternal fire as possible. (David Bentley Hart, That All Shall Be Saved)

Feser's failure to address this tension undermines his moral framework, as the potential for eternal suffering outweighs the supposed moral imperative to procreate.


The Concept of Hell: Theological and Philosophical Challenges

The doctrine of eternal hell presents both theological and philosophical difficulties. Feser's reliance on Catholic tradition requires him to grapple with the idea of eternal punishment, which many find incompatible with human notions of justice. Arthur Schopenhauer offers a counterpoint, questioning the coherence of eternal existence:

What has been created by another has had a beginning to its existence… If at birth I first came to be and was created out of nothing, then it is highly probable that I will become nothing again in death. Infinite duration in the future and non-existence in the past do not go together. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena)

Philosophically, hell raises questions about personal identity, time, and divine justice that Feser does not adequately address. Historically, the concept of hell served a didactic purpose, reinforcing ethical behavior through fear. Sociologically, it emerged as part of the civilizing process, rooted in primal fears of death and evolving into a dualistic afterlife narrative. Bart D. Ehrman notes that early Christian views, including those of Jesus, did not align with later Catholic doctrines of heaven and hell:

To put it succinctly: the founder of Christianity did not believe that the soul of a person who died would go to heaven or hell. (Bart D. Ehrman, Heaven and Hell: A History of the Afterlife)

Jesus, according to Ehrman, anticipated a resurrection of the righteous to an earthly kingdom, with the wicked facing annihilation, not eternal torment. This historical perspective challenges Feser's reliance on traditional Catholic soteriology.


Catholic Exclusivism and Contradictory Claims

Feser's theology aligns with the Catholic Church's historical claim to exclusive salvation, as articulated in documents like the Council of Florence. However, modern Catholic thought, as exemplified by John Walsh, S.J., in This Is Catholicism (1959), introduces a nuanced position:

A sincere desire for salvation coincides necessarily with a desire to belong to the Catholic Church… Strange as it may seem, therefore, a non-Catholic who sincerely yearns to do everything necessary for salvation (even when he believes that one of the requisites for salvation is to condemn Catholicism!) is, all unconsciously, longing to be a Catholic. (John Walsh, cited in Walter Kaufmann, The Faith of a Heretic)

This doctrine of "implicit desire" suggests that non-Catholics seeking salvation are unknowingly aligned with the Church, rendering explicit membership less critical. However, this position undermines the necessity of sacraments like baptism and confession, creating a theological paradox that Feser does not address. It also contradicts the strict exclusivism of earlier teachings, revealing inconsistencies in Catholic soteriology that Feser's arguments fail to resolve.

Conclusion

Feser's treatment of suffering, salvation, and hell in The Last Superstition lacks transparency and consistency. By omitting the restrictive conditions of Catholic salvation, he presents an overly optimistic theodicy that does not align with traditional doctrine. His advocacy for procreation ignores the moral risks posed by the doctrine of hell, and his failure to engage with historical and philosophical critiques of eternal punishment weakens his position. Readers seeking a balanced understanding of these issues should consult alternative perspectives, such as those of Schopenhauer, Hart, Ehrman, and Kaufmann, to critically evaluate Feser's claims.

Critique of Edward Feser's Proof of God from Motion and the Questionability of Cosmological Arguments

Edward Feser's reconstruction of Aquinas's First Way, the proof of God from motion, in The Last Superstition attempts to establish the existence of an unmoved mover as the ultimate cause of all motion. However, his argument is marred by conceptual inconsistencies, a conflation of Aristotelian causal categories, and a failure to address significant objections. This critique evaluates Feser's proof, its reliance on Aristotelian metaphysics, and the broader challenges facing cosmological arguments, particularly in light of modern philosophical and scientific perspectives.

Feser's Proof from Motion: An Overview

Feser's proof begins with a causal series involving simultaneous motion, illustrated by a hand moving a stick, which moves a stone. He argues that this series, termed an "essentially ordered" or hierarchical causal series, cannot regress infinitely and requires an unmoved mover as its origin. The causal chain is traced backward from the stone to the hand, arm, muscles, nerves, and deeper physical levels (neurons, molecules, atoms, fundamental forces), all acting simultaneously. Feser posits that this series terminates in a mover that is pure actuality, devoid of potentiality, which he identifies as God.

Conceptual Inconsistencies in Feser's Argument

Feser's argument falters due to several critical flaws:

1. Conflation of Causal Types

Aristotle distinguishes between final causes (teleological, holistic explanations where the whole precedes and defines the parts) and efficient causes (mechanical, reductive explanations where parts precede the whole). As Frederick C. Beiser notes:

First, the final cause gives the idea of the whole, so that when we explain something according to a final cause we make the whole the explanans, the particular actions or parts the explanandum… Mechanical explanation is just the opposite: the parts are prior to the whole and make it possible… Second, a final cause acts without being acted upon… An efficient cause, however, acts only if it is acted upon. (Frederick C. Beiser, Late German Idealism)

Feser's analysis shifts from a teleological framework to a mechanistic one, particularly when he moves inward to analyze the arm's components (muscles, nerves, atoms). This contradicts Aristotelian principles, as the efficient cause (e.g., the hand moving the stick) is distinct from the material cause (the arm's atomic structure). By treating the arm's material components as efficient causes, Feser blurs these distinctions, undermining his Aristotelian framework. For instance, he states:

The motion of the stone depends on the motion of the hand, which depends on the motion of the stick, which depends on the firing of the neurons… which depends on the atomic basis of that molecular structure, which depends on electromagnetism, gravitation, the weak and strong forces, and so on and so forth, all simultaneously. (Edward Feser)

This inward analysis remains within the arm's material structure, failing to extend the causal series beyond it. The atoms are part of the arm's material cause, not its efficient cause, which would involve an external agent (e.g., the human will or a physical force).

2. Shift from Motion to Existence

Feser further complicates his argument by transitioning from motion to existence without justification:

To account for the actualization of the potential motion of the stone we had eventually to appeal to the actualization of the potential existence of various deeper levels of reality. (Edward Feser)

Aristotle identifies four types of motion: quantitative (growth/shrinkage), qualitative (change in form), spatial (change in place), and ontological (coming into being/passing away). Feser's proof begins with spatial motion (hand, stick, stone) but shifts to ontological motion (the existence of neurons, molecules, atoms). This conflation violates Aristotle's principle that change occurs between opposites (e.g., cold to hot, not motion to existence). Explaining motion does not inherently require explaining the existence of the moving object, as existence is presupposed in any change. This shift introduces conceptual confusion and deviates from Aquinas's original focus on motion.

3. Unjustified Assumption of Infinite Divisibility

Feser's inward analysis assumes that physical entities are infinitely divisible, requiring a regress to ever-deeper levels until a non-composite, transcendent cause (God) is posited. However, he does not prove this assumption. If entities are not infinitely divisible, the regress could terminate in fundamental entities (e.g., quarks, quantum fields) that are self-moving or active without requiring a divine cause. Feser's reluctance to accept such "simples" suggests a strategic avoidance of naturalistic explanations. As Fox ITK argues:

If things like quarks/fields are not fundamental… God is holding up by transitivity of his act to all the observable universe we see, but not everything because the quarks/forces are being actualized by whatever composes them… But if the quarks/fields really were fundamental, then we have no regress of dependence on further parts, and so no need to invoke the divine cause. (Fox ITK)

This dilemma highlights Feser's reliance on an unproven premise to force a transcendent conclusion.

The Problem of Infinite Regress

Feser asserts that an essentially ordered causal series cannot be infinite, as it would lack a first cause, rendering the series inexplicable. However, this claim is question-begging, as it assumes the necessity of a first cause without demonstrating an internal contradiction in an infinite series. William Lane Craig notes:

The principal argument used to eliminate such a regress is that in essentially ordered infinite regress of causes, only instrumental causes would exist, and, hence there would be no intrinsic causality in the series… [But] if an instrumental cause is defined as a cause depending ultimately upon a first cause, then it cannot be shown that the causes in an infinite regress are truly instrumental. (William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz)

An infinite series of instrumental causes, each deriving causal efficacy from its predecessor, is conceivable without requiring a first cause. Alternatively, a series could be structured with a "quasi-first cause" (e.g., a relative starting point within an infinite series), as suggested by the possibility of mereological gunk, where parts have parts ad infinitum. Feser's failure to disprove the logical possibility of an infinite regress undermines his argument.


Alternative Explanations: Mundane Prime Movers

Feser's proof does not necessitate a transcendent unmoved mover. Aristotle himself suggests that the causal series can terminate in a human being:

The stick moves the stone and is moved by the hand, which again is moved by the man: in the man, however, we have reached a mover that is not so in virtue of being moved by something else. (Aristotle, Physics 256a-256b)

Scott Macdonald reinforces this:

All that is required of P [the primary mover] is that it be in actuality with respect to S; P’s being in actuality with respect to S is what makes P the primary mover in this causal series ordered per se… The proof from motion gives us no reason to suppose there are any primary movers other than mundane primary movers. (Scott Macdonald, Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument)

Mundane prime movers, such as human intention, animals, or physical forces (e.g., fire, electricity), can account for motion without invoking a divine cause. For example, the intention to move the arm could initiate the causal series, negating the need for a transcendent mover.

Modern Physics and Aristotelian Causality

Feser's reliance on Aristotelian causality is problematic in light of modern physics, which operates without traditional notions of material, formal, efficient, or final causes. Sean

Carroll observes:

At the deepest level we currently know about, the basic notions are things like “spacetime,” “quantum fields,” “equations of motion,” and “interactions.” No causes, whether material, formal, efficient, or final. (Sean Carroll, The Big Picture)

In quantum mechanics, conventional causality breaks down, and entities like quantum fields operate without requiring an external efficient cause. Feser's inward analysis, which remains within the physical domain (arm to atoms to forces), fails to reach a non-physical or mental cause, such as human intention, which could plausibly initiate motion. His avoidance of mental causation may stem from the philosophical challenges it poses (e.g., explaining the cause of the mental), but it leaves his argument incomplete.


Hylomorphism and Holistic Causality

Feser's argument also misapplies Aristotelian hylomorphism, which posits that substances are composites of form and matter, with the form (e.g., the soul in living beings) ontologically prior to the parts. Herbert McCabe explains:

A leopard is self-moving because the action of one part of it, the brain… moves another part of it, the legs… It is because we think this that we think the leopard is self-moving and thus a living thing. (Herbert McCabe, On Aquinas)

In hylomorphism, the whole (form plus matter) precedes the parts, not vice versa. Feser's claim that the arm's parts (atoms, molecules) efficiently cause the whole contradicts this, as the efficient cause of a substance (e.g., a rubber ball) is an external agent (e.g., a factory worker), not its material components. Aristotle's formal cause, often identical to the final and efficient causes in living beings, actualizes the substance, enabling self-motion.


Wolfgang Welsch illustrates this with plants:

The movement is not simply something caused from the outside… but it lies in the nature of this being and has its drive from this being itself. (Wolfgang Welsch, Der Philosoph: Die Gedankenwelt des Aristoteles)

Feser's mechanistic interpretation of parts causing the whole aligns with reductionism, not Aristotelian holism, undermining his Thomistic framework.
The Problem of Total Dependence

Feser's broader project assumes that all composite entities are totally dependent on a simple, transcendent cause (God). However, John Deck argues that this is inconsistent with Aquinas's essence-existence distinction:

For the substance or essence of a created thing to be “to it through itself” is incompatible with the total dependence of the creature upon the Creator… If the creature is to be totally dependent, there can be nothing in him other than his relation to the Creator. (John Deck, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Language of Total Dependence)

A composite entity, by having an essence distinct from its existence, possesses some degree of independence, contradicting total dependence. If creatures are dual (essence and existence), one part may escape divine causality, suggesting that composites can have intrinsic actuality, negating the need for a transcendent cause.

String Theory and Simples

An alternative naturalistic explanation involves string theory, where one-dimensional strings could act as unmoved movers. Brian Greene suggests that strings, with their vibration patterns, produce quarks and other particles. These strings could be simples—non-composite entities with active potency but no passive potency, incapable of being affected by external causes. Unlike Thomistic substances, strings lack cognition or teleological purpose, operating as brute facts. Bertrand Russell and Galen Strawson critique the concept of substance:

‘Substance’ is merely a convenient way of collecting events into bundles… There is no real distinction, only a conceptual distinction, between a concrete object… and its concrete propertiedness. (Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy; Galen Strawson, Nietzsche’s Metaphysics?)

Strings, as simples, could initiate causal series without requiring a divine cause, challenging Feser's rejection of immanent simples.


Kant and the Cosmological Argument

Immanuel Kant's critique of the cosmological argument, as articulated in Critique of Pure Reason, undermines Feser's proof by exposing its reliance on a necessary being:

The concept of a necessary being is shown by discussion of the ontological argument to be empty… ‘Absolute necessity is a necessity that is to be found in thought alone.’ (Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic)

Kant argues that the cosmological argument reduces to the ontological argument, as it posits a necessary being whose existence is not empirically verifiable. Walter Kaufmann elaborates:

A “necessary being” is comparable to a “valid being”… The adjective “necessary” has no applicability to beings. (Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy)

The idea of a necessary being, whether logically or metaphysically defined, fails to establish factual existence, rendering Feser's proof speculative.

Teleology and Circular Reasoning

Feser's concept of causality presupposes teleology, which he later justifies in the Fifth Way, creating a circular argument. If causality is inherently teleological, requiring a divine intelligence, the First Way assumes what the Fifth Way seeks to prove, committing a petitio principii. This circularity limits the proof's neutrality and philosophical rigor.

Conclusion

Feser's proof of God from motion fails due to its conflation of Aristotelian causal categories, unjustified assumptions about infinite divisibility and regress, and neglect of naturalistic alternatives like mundane prime movers or string theory. Modern physics and philosophical critiques, from Kant to Deck, highlight the proof's reliance on questionable premises and circular reasoning. The broader cosmological argument struggles to maintain neutrality, as its reliance on a necessary being invites naturalistic counter-explanations. As Lubor Velecky notes:

There is no reason which is nobody’s reason… In this respect, there are no impartial spectators, nor are the differences between believers and unbelievers due to mistakes of logic on one side. (Lubor Velecky, The Five Ways)

The possibility of infinite causal series, immanent simples, or holistic self-motion suggests that Feser's proof does not conclusively establish a transcendent unmoved mover, leaving room for agnosticism or naturalistic interpretations.

Appendix: Fox ITK’s Comment on Feser vs. Oppy Discussion

The point Ed presses about the principle of individuation seems to me very weak. ‘What distinguishes one simple from another?’ doesn’t that by which they are distinguished lead to composition? I don’t see why things like Cambridge properties, or spatial or temporal properties are like ‘parts’. Ed would accept that God has so called Cambridge properties, but being simple they aren’t parts, they are relations etc which are extrinsic. Why aren’t these enough to distinguish simples? As far as I see they would. Ed’s response was to go beyond composition at this point to ask ‘what caused these different extrinsic properties?’ And that’s a different argument entirely, and if this is where we get to then we have moved beyond the scope of the argument to support it, and so I’d deem the argument a failure (after all, Oppy could just appeal to say past events explain why the spatial properties are such and such (of which this would be an accidental cause, which need not persist as an essential cause would).

(Fox ITK, comment on Feser-Oppy discussion, available at: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1s-NIlcWUwgy1sJJx5qLXwPBtDOBR4eznT0bFy6Yh5Js/edit)

Critique of Edward Feser's Concept of Teleology

Edward Feser's defense of Aristotelian-Thomistic teleology in The Last Superstition posits that natural substances exhibit intrinsic directedness toward ends, necessitating final causes to explain this purposiveness. However, his account overlooks alternative interpretations of causality, introduces unnecessary speculative elements, and leads to problematic implications such as fatalism. This critique examines the distinctions in causality, the dispensability of final causes, and the tensions within Feser's framework, drawing on historical and philosophical objections.

Meanings of Causality and the Sufficiency of Natural Necessity

Causality can be understood in at least two senses: (1) A as the initiator of B or a change in B, and (2) given B's occurrence, A must necessarily have preceded it (relational causality). For the first sense, teleology is not essential; natural necessity suffices, where A necessarily produces B or a change in B, capturing inevitable regularities without invoking purposive direction. Introducing teleology adds a speculative layer without enhancing explanatory power.

Medieval nominalists, for instance, dispensed with final causes, relying solely on formal and efficient causes for explanations. This approach aligns with modern critiques that teleology reverses cause-effect order, anthropomorphizes non-human entities, and potentially halts scientific inquiry.

Dispensability of Final Causes: The Case of Suárez

Final causes may be unnecessary for explaining intrinsic teleology in natural substances. As Stephan Schmid argues:

[N]atural substances display a kind of intrinsic directedness towards the effects they are disposed to cause in virtue of their form. That is, just in virtue of being Aristotelian efficient causes (which act out of certain causal powers) natural substances engage in processes which exhibit a kind of internal teleology in the sense that these processes are intrinsically directed towards a certain outcome or terminus. Yet, arising from the mere dispositional directedness of natural processes this internal teleology does not require any influence of a final cause. (Stephan Schmid, Finality without Final Causes? – Suárez’s Account of Natural Teleology)

And further:

[T]he teleology in nature could simply be accounted for in terms of the dispositional directedness of natural substances so that it is unnecessary to additionally appeal to final causes. (Stephan Schmid, Finality without Final Causes? – Suárez’s Account of Natural Teleology)

Suárez's account, however, encounters difficulties when extended to divine teleology. His theory requires final causation to involve the actualization of a will, but God, as actus purus (pure act), lacks unactualized potentialities. Thus, God's immutable nature precludes change, rendering teleological explanations problematic for divine action:

Suárez cannot immediately adopt [the] widespread theistic account of natural teleology, for this account presupposes that it is unproblematic that God’s actions are subject to final causes… Yet, it is exactly this presupposition that turns out to be problematic for Suárez: his theory of final causality in terms of metaphorical motion requires that final causation involves a genuine motion—namely the actualization of a will (or at least an appetite). But since God is a perfect being or pure act (actus purus), as scholastics used to say, God cannot have any unactualized faculties or potentialities. God is an eternal and immutable being and as such there can be no sort of change in God. (Stephan Schmid, Finality without Final Causes? – Suárez’s Account of Natural Teleology)

This tension highlights the challenges in reconciling teleology with a theistic framework without introducing inconsistencies.

Teleological Fatalism and Its Implications

Insisting on teleology in the first sense of causality risks a fatalistic worldview. If the microcosm (Feser's "ever-deeper levels of reality") consists of teleologically ordered causal chains, extending bottom-up yields a fully purposive universe where nothing non-teleological remains. The macrocosm, with its efficient cause (a First Cause sustaining the universe), implies a final cause, subordinating all elements—including human intentions—to it.

This structure suggests cosmic harmony and predetermination, where deviations are illusory and integrated into the teleological whole. Absolute morality and culpability dissolve, as actions align with natural ends. Feser's denial of a final cause for the universe would undermine his credibility, given his emphasis on teleology.

Critique of Feser's Examples

Feser's examples often fail to demonstrate intrinsic teleology convincingly. He separates cause (e.g., a brick) from effect (e.g., a broken window), but teleological attribution (the brick "aimed" at destruction) requires an external agent (a vandal). Without this, the brick's trajectory is merely a natural necessity, not purposive.

Natural events from multiple causal factors (e.g., wind propelling a brick) yield non-teleological outcomes, as colliding dispositions produce coerced motions without directed ends. Feser's claims about the moon orbiting Earth or electrons in atoms rely on outdated Aristotelian physics, ignoring modern explanations like gravitational forces or quantum mechanics, where resultant motions arise from confrontational forces rather than intrinsic goals.

Other examples, such as matches "aiming" at fire or fragile glass "directed" toward breaking, are context-sensitive. Fragility depends on external conditions, not an absolute disposition. The heart's telos (pumping blood) could be reframed as mere muscular activity or self-preservation for power expansion, illustrating the arbitrariness of teleological assignments.

Conflicts with Intelligent Design and Paley

Feser distances himself from Intelligent Design (ID) and Paley, emphasizing intrinsic over extrinsic teleology. However, this stance conflicts with some Catholic thinkers. Marie George notes:

In his article “Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide,” Edward Feser attempts to explain why Aristotelian-Thomistic (A-T) partisans of the Fifth Way generally reject the positions of the Intelligent Design school and distance themselves from Paley. In this note, I argue that on a number of points Feser fails to accurately convey A-T views pertinent to reasoning to the existence of God starting from teleology or action for an end in nature. (Marie George, An Aristotelian-Thomist Responds to Edward Feser’s “Teleology”)

Simon Francis Gaine argues for analogical language treating God as an "artificer":

Taking an Aristotelian rather than Paleyite position, Professor Feser emphasizes the difference between organisms and artefacts… But where his Aristotelianism leads Feser in regard to God is an example of a seemingly apophatic rather than analogical theology: God cannot be called an “artificer.”… I reply, however, that the Christian theologian has reason to speak by way of analogy of the Trinitarian God as an artificer and creatures as divine artefacts. (Simon Francis Gaine, God is an Artificer: A Reply to Professor Edward Feser)

Feser's rejection of Paley leaves him vulnerable to Hume's objections, as Schopenhauer observes:

Hume’s reflection and acumen alone stood the test… in his “Dialogues on Natural Religion”… this true precursor of Kant calls attention to the fact… that there is no resemblance at all between the works of Nature and those of an Art which proceeds according to a design. (Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Will in Nature)

Anthony Kenny distinguishes purpose from design:

Design differs from purpose because design is purpose preceded by an idea… Aristotle did not believe that the world was created; for him teleology was a basic fact about the cosmos, and no extracosmic designer was needed… It was Aquinas who formulated the argument from purpose to design. (Anthony Kenny, We Have All Been Here Before)

Kenny critiques Feser's intellectual requirement for teleology:

Surely this is to treat final causes as if they were efficient causes: for it is only of such causes that it is true that an effect cannot precede its cause. (Anthony Kenny, We Have All Been Here Before)

And on animal instincts:

If even regular adaptive behaviour calls for intelligence, Aquinas has given us no reason why we should not call the swallows and the spiders intelligent themselves, rather than looking for an intelligence to direct them from outside the universe. (Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways)

Schopenhauer reinforces this:

[W]orks produced by animal instinct… are throughout constituted as if they were the result of an intentional conception… whereas they are evidently the work of a blind impulse, i.e. of a will not guided by knowledge. (Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Will in Nature)


Historical Persistence of Teleology-Like Concepts

Feser's claim that teleology was banished post-Descartes overlooks its persistence in German philosophy (e.g., Leibniz, young Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Trendelenburg, Schopenhauer). This neglect cannot be attributed solely to philosophical developments.


Analogical Language and Its Limitations

Feser's use of analogy in theological statements obscures imprecise meanings, potentially evading critique. Paul van Buren rejects analogical God-talk:

The cognitive approach requires speaking of that which it admits is ineffable… Even analogical affirmations should commit one to something. (Paul M. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel Based on an Analysis of Its Language)

Walter Kaufmann concurs:

The attempt to salvage religious propositions by admitting their literal falseness while maintaining their truth… as analogous or symbolic, must fail. It ignores the essential ambiguity of the propositions. (Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy)

Charles Hartshorne adds:

To cover the nakedness of [the] inconsistency with talk of the merely “symbolic” or analogical meaning of theological terms is only to announce one’s intention of not standing by any affirmations or denials which one makes in these matters. (Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection)

Conclusion

Feser's teleology introduces speculative elements without necessity, risks fatalism, and selectively applies purposiveness. Alternative explanations via natural necessity or dispositional directedness suffice, avoiding the inconsistencies in divine teleology and anthropomorphic attributions. Historical critiques from Hume, Kant, and Schopenhauer, alongside intra-Thomistic debates, underscore these weaknesses. Teleological claims often pose stimulating questions but rarely yield satisfactory answers, as Fritz Mauthner notes. For further remarks on Aristotelian teleology, consult the section "Problematic Aristotelian Teleology" in the initial blog entry on natural law.

Critique of Edward Feser's Arguments on Free Will

Edward Feser's treatment of free will in The Last Superstition, particularly in the chapter "Universal Acid," presents a cursory defense rooted in Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. He posits that formal and final causes resolve the issue of free will, yet this approach is superficial and fails to engage deeply with the philosophical complexities. This critique examines the inadequacies of Feser's arguments, highlighting how essentialism inherently undermines free will, the compatibilist implications of Thomism, and the broader tensions with determinism, supported by historical philosophical perspectives and biblical references.


Weaknesses in Feser's Treatment

Feser's discussion dedicates minimal space to free will, despite its centrality to philosophy. If free will is absent, absolute morality collapses, rendering ethical accountability illusory. Feser assumes that final and formal causes—present even in plants—sufficiently establish human freedom. This is overly simplistic, as essentialism, including the Aristotelian variant, precludes genuine freedom unless substantiated otherwise.

Essentialism posits that each entity acts according to its fixed essence, incapable of transcending its nature without disintegration. Human essence, with its character, personality, and faculties, dictates actions necessarily. True freedom—arbitrary or independent of one's being—lacks plausibility, resembling external determination (e.g., divine grace or quantum events) rather than self-determination. Even unified freedom within essence is illogical: a specific being oriented toward God (per Feser) cannot simultaneously embody indeterminate indifference to all ends.

Thomistic determinism exacerbates this: no potential (e.g., human actions) self-actualizes; external factors are required. This necessitates fideistic acceptance of free will, as rational justification falters.

Philosophical Objections: Jacobi and Essentialism

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi articulates the incompatibility:

The belief in human freedom is incompatible with the view of reality that reason seems to require us to accept. Jacobi's claim is not merely that the belief in our own freedom cannot be rationally justified; he holds that any thoroughly consistent, rational understanding of the world will be committed to ruling out this very possibility. We are forced, then, on Jacobi's view, to choose between an irrational faith in the possibility of freedom and a rational but completely deterministic view of the world in which there is no room for self-determined agency. (Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity)

Essentialism and the principle of sufficient reason exclude free will, ignoring theological notions like divine providence, predestination, or original sin.
Biblical Perspectives on the Unfreedom of the Will

Scriptural passages underscore determinism:

Jeremiah 10:23: "I know, O Lord, that the way of man is not in himself, that it is not in man who walks to direct his steps."

Proverbs 21:1: "The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: He turneth it whithersoever He will."

Romans 9:15: "For he says to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion."

Romans 9:16: "So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy."

Romans 9:18: "So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills."

These suggest human actions stem from divine will, not autonomous choice.

Schopenhauer's Critique of Theism and Freedom

Arthur Schopenhauer argues that theism and moral responsibility are irreconcilable:

The concept of a moral freedom, on the other hand, is inseparable from that of originality. For that a being is the work of another, yet in his willing and doing is supposed to be free, can be formulated in words but cannot be achieved in thoughts. After all, the one who called him into existence out of nothing has in the same way co-created and determined his essence as well, i.e., all his qualities. For one can never create without creating a something, i.e., a precisely determined essence in every sense and in all its qualities. However, later all its expressions and effects flow with necessity from these same determined qualities, in that they are only the qualities themselves brought into play, which merely required an external occasion in order to appear. How a human being is determines how he must act; therefore blame and merit do not adhere to his individual deeds, but to his essence and being. For this reason theism and the moral responsibility of the human being are incompatible, precisely because responsibility always falls back on the author of the being, where it has its centre of gravity. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Volume 2, translated by Christopher Janaway)

And further:

On the other hand, theism in regard to the past is also in conflict with morality, because it abolishes freedom and accountability. For neither guilt nor merit can be conceived in a being that, in regard to its existence and essence, is the work of another. Already Vauvenargues says very correctly: ‘A being that has received everything can act only according to what has been given to it; and all the divine power that is infinite could not make it independent.’ For, as any other conceivable being, it cannot act except in accordance with its constitution and thereby make the latter known; but it is created here the way it is constituted. If it acts badly, that is a result of its being bad, and then the guilt does not belong to it but to him who made it. It is inevitable that the author of its existence and its constitution, as well as the circumstances in which it has been placed, is also the author of its actions and its deeds, which are determined by all this with such certainty as a triangle by two angles and a line. St Augustine, Hume, and Kant have clearly seen and understood the correctness of this reasoning, while others have ignored it in shrewd and cowardly fashion. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Volume 2, translated and edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway)

Schopenhauer concludes:

Everything that is also is something, has an essence, a constitution, a character; it must be active, must act (which means to be active according to motives) when the external occasions arise that call forth its individual manifestations. The source of its existence is also the source of its What, its constitution, its essence, since both differ conceptually, but in reality cannot be separated. However, what has an essence, that is, a nature, a character, a constitution, can only be active in accordance with it and not in any other way; merely the point in time and the particular form and constitution of the individual actions are each time determined by the occurring motives. That the creator created human beings free implies an impossibility, namely that he endowed them with an existence without essence, thus had given them existence merely in the abstract by leaving it up to them what they wanted to exist as. On this point I ask the reader to consult §20 of my treatise On the Basis of Morals. – Moral freedom and responsibility, or accountability, absolutely presuppose aseity. Actions will always result with necessity from character, that is, from the specific and thus unalterable constitution of a being under the influence and in accordance with motives; therefore, if the being is to be responsible, it must exist originally and by virtue of its own absolute power; it must, in regard to its existence and essence, be its own doing and the author of itself if it is to be the true author of its deeds. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Volume 2, translated and edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway)

Mainländer's Determinism

Philipp Mainländer echoes this necessity:

The will is never free and everything in the world happens with necessity. Every human being has a certain character at the time when a motive approaches him, who, if the motive is sufficient, must act. The motive occurs with necessity (because each motive is always the link of a causal series dominated by necessity), and the character must follow it with necessity, because it is a certain one and the motive is sufficient... How a human being is determines how he must act; therefore blame and merit do not adhere to his individual deeds, but to his essence and being. (Philipp Mainländer)

Voltaire's Critique

Voltaire questions the liberty of indifference:

What do you understand by the liberty of indifference? ... That would be a pleasant liberty, truly! God would have made you a fine present, much to boast of, certainly! What use to you would be a power which could only be exercised on such futile occasions? But in truth it is ridiculous to suppose the will of willing to spit on the right or left. Not only is the will of willing absurd, but it is certain that several little circumstances determine these acts which you call indifferent. You are no more free in these acts than in others. Yet you are free at all times, and in all places, when you can do what you wish to do... The other animals will have the same liberty, then, the same power? Why not? They have senses, memory, feeling, perceptions, as we have. They act with spontaneity as we act. They must have also, as we have, the power of acting by virtue of their perceptions, by virtue of the play of their organs. (Voltaire)

Thomistic Compatibilism and Divine Concurrentism

Thomists reject "determinism of circumstances" but accept divine concurrentism, rendering them compatibilists regarding God's influence:

For example, Thomas Flint... concedes that Thomists rarely style themselves as compatibilists, in that they reject a ‘determinism of circumstances’... Nonetheless, Flint complains that ‘the kind of divine activity that the Thomists see as compatible with human freedom would not be deemed compatible by those with libertarian inclinations’... In sum, if we think of compatibilism in the broader sense as the view that a free action can be externally determined, does it not appear that Thomism is indeed ultimately rooted in compatibilism? (Christopher J. Insole, Kant and the Creation of Freedom – A Theological Problem)

Anthony Kenny affirms:

Aquinas’ account of the rooting of freedom in reason shows him to be a compatibilist... ‘Perhaps we too’, Pasnau says, ‘do not escape the chains of causal necessity. But if we are determined, we are determined by our own beliefs and values, not simply by the brute design of nature and the happenstance of events. This difference, for Aquinas, makes all the difference.’ (Anthony Kenny, review of Robert Pasnau's Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature)

Essentialism ignores this, attributing human actions to fixed natures. God's actualization of potentials (e.g., mental intentions) erodes autonomy, reducing subjectivity to divine determination and contradicting Kantian spontaneity.

Dishonesty in Theistic Proofs

Theistic arguments often presuppose determinism to establish God, then pivot to affirm free will for moral accountability, exhibiting inconsistency.

Conclusion

Feser's arguments on free will are inadequately developed and fail to reconcile essentialism with genuine freedom. Philosophical critiques from Jacobi, Schopenhauer, Mainländer, and Voltaire, alongside biblical determinism, underscore the incompatibility. Thomistic compatibilism and concurrentism introduce further tensions, veiling determinism under divine agency. Rational analysis favors determinism, rendering free will a fideistic assumption.

Critique of Edward Feser's Natural Law and Its Compatibility with Evolution

Edward Feser's Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law in The Last Superstition relies on fixed, static forms to derive moral imperatives from human nature. However, evolutionary theory challenges this foundation, positing dynamic change as inherent to organic life. This critique explores how evolution undermines Feser's framework, rendering natural law indeterminate without theological presuppositions, and examines broader philosophical objections, including those from evolutionary psychology and historical critiques.

Evolution as the True Universal Acid

Feser's dismissal of evolution's implications overlooks its transformative impact on metaphysics and ethics. Evolution, not final causality, emerges as the "universal acid" dissolving static Aristotelian forms. In the organic realm, species lack immutable essences; instead, forms are fluid, shaped by natural selection.

Consider squirrels: their traits result from brutal selection pressures, with generational variations altering abilities and qualities. Change is integral to their essence, not accidental. This extends to humans, where evolution affects behaviors, dispositions, and tendencies—domains addressed by evolutionary psychology. Homosexuality, for instance, cannot be deemed contrary to an absolute human form if forms evolve.

Functions arise from selection, not divine intent. Incorporating evolution into natural law requires evaluating biological functionalities holistically, beyond superficial teleology. Speculatively, a conscious organic robot with engineered functions would lack moral obligation to them, highlighting natural law's contingency on divine authorship.

For a detailed analysis, refer to the blog entry: All-Round Critique of Thomistic Natural Law.

Dependence on Theological and Denominational Beliefs

Thomistic natural law presupposes belief in God and Catholic teachings, guided by the Holy Spirit. Without this, it remains indeterminate—nature's "silence" allows multiple interpretations, and moral "oughts" derive from ecclesiastical authority, not philosophy.

Plato's theory of ideas inaugurates this disguised subjectivism as objectivism. Absent a legislator (deity), natural law lacks coherence. Disagreements persist: intentions remain opaque, and consensus eludes even proponents (e.g., competing Thomistic versions from Grisez, Finnis, George vs. Feser).

Mathematical analogies fail; if mathematics errs, moral assumptions are fallible.

Henry Sidgwick critiques:

If for example we want to get practical guidance from the conception of human nature regarded as a system of impulses and dispositions, we must obviously give a special precision to the meaning of ‘natural’... I don’t think that any definition of natural shows this notion to be capable of providing an independent ethical first principle. (Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics)

Kai Nielsen adds:

We are told that natural moral laws are self-evident, absolute, rational laws... But there is here no genuine surcease from our perplexities about an objective justification of moral beliefs... Natural moral law theorists confuse talking about what is the case with talking about what ought to be the case. (Kai Nielsen, Atheism and Philosophy)


A. C. Grayling on Sexuality and Societal Attitudes

A. C. Grayling critiques cultural attitudes toward sex, advocating natural integration:

Sober reflection suggests that if sex were allowed a more natural place in human life it would take up far less time and make far less trouble than it currently does... Nature has made sex pleasurable not just to ensure reproduction but, in some of the higher mammals at least, to create bonds. The narrow views of the ancient Jews and the modern Catholics, that sex must always have pregnancy as a possible outcome, miss a very important point here... It is now recognised that effective contraception and greater economic independence have together wrought significant changes in attitudes to sex among women. Moralists decry the increased sexual freedom that results... But on the other hand it might be said that less frustrated and more experienced grown-ups make better choices about long-term relationships eventually, and that anyway pleasure is a good – and sexual pleasure a great good – providing it is responsibly done: and if responsibly done, it is hard to see the objection... As this suggests, sex is not an ethically neutral activity. On the contrary, it carries a high ethical value, which is that when it is consensual and responsible, and governed by the principle that those engaging in it must not do harm, it is a deeply valuable thing... It is an oddity that our culture should be so vehemently anti-gay given our simultaneously held view of classical Greece, which we admire and claim as our cultural ancestor... These points demonstrate that invocations of ‘nature’ provide no ground for opposing homosexuality. The real source of opposition is religious. (A. C. Grayling, The God Argument)

Feser's Distinction: "Contrary to" vs. "Other Than"

Feser distinguishes acts "contrary to" nature (morally evil) from those "other than" nature (morally neutral), adding "in accordance with" for moral good. Trivial acts (e.g., eating breakfast) become good, aligning with nature.

However, distinctions falter: masturbation for medical purposes (e.g., sperm samples) is "contrary to," yet necessary. Chewing gum is "other than," despite straining functions. Critics like John Skalko find it unclear:

Feser relies upon an unclear account of contrary use and other than use, which is either ad hoc or cannot grant him the conclusion he desires. (John Skalko, Disordered Actions)

Germain Grisez rejects the perverted faculty argument:

The many attempts over the years to show the intrinsic immorality of contraception using this faulty premise have exposed Catholic moral thought to endless ridicule and surely have caused harm in other ways. (Germain Grisez, Contraception and the New Natural Law)

Grisez's example (ingesting food for comfort, pumped out) parallels contraception, frustrating ends without moral condemnation.

Historical debates (e.g., 1920s Catholic philosophers) reveal inconsistencies, with figures like Cooper questioning natural functions.

Evolutionary Psychology and Conservatism

Evolutionary psychology explains conservative focus on sexuality:

Organisms are better or worse off... depending on the rules of the mating game... Low-quality males would have a deep, abiding, even crucial interest in rules that force everyone into monogamy... This implies that—at least the possibility that—some modules are designed to try to impose certain sexual rules on other people. (Robert Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite)

Conservatives, as "beta males," favor binding rules like indissoluble marriage.

Homosexuality as Natural

Homosexuality aligns with bisexuality in embryonic development:

All these attempts to explain homosexuality were misguided... All are bisexual... This predisposition for homosexuality is still present... in every human being... Finally, a large number of homosexual acts have also been observed among animals. (Otto Weininger, Sex and Character)

Evolutionary theories (kin altruism, female fertility) explain persistence:

The female fertility hypothesis... genes for male homosexuality can evolve if they produce an increased reproductive rate in the female relatives of male homosexuals. (David M. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology)

Normativity and Ought

Inclinations yield "is" statements, not "ought." Normativity requires conscious will. Peter Stemmer's schema:

(1) A must do X for Y to happen,
(2) A wants Y to happen.
(3) So A must do X.

This personal will conflicts with natural law's objectivity.

Without God, bodily teleology lacks moral imperatives. Revelation is needed, rendering natural law non-philosophical.

Conclusion

Evolution erodes fixed forms, making natural law indeterminate without Catholic theology. Critiques reveal internal inconsistencies, historical debates, and evolutionary explanations for moral intuitions. Feser's distinctions fail scrutiny, and normativity eludes derivation from nature alone.

Further Reflections on Grace, Predestination, Hell, and Morality

The Thomistic framework, as articulated by Edward Feser in The Last Superstition, encounters profound challenges when extended to concepts of grace, predestination, and the afterlife. These elements introduce layers of complexity and potential incoherence, particularly in relation to moral accountability and the nature of divine justice. This section examines these issues, highlighting their implications for the valuation of human actions and the overall coherence of Thomistic ethics.

Excluding Grace and Predestination to Avoid Confusion

To maintain clarity in the analysis of free will and moral responsibility, concepts such as grace and predestination must be set aside, as they engender significant confusion. Predestination, in particular, posits that an individual's ultimate fate—alignment with good or evil—is predetermined. Under this view, actions serve merely as indicators of one's predestined status, rather than genuine causes shaping character. Consequently, deeds do not causally influence moral disposition; they are symptomatic of a fixed essence. This undermines the foundational Thomistic claim that human actions reflect autonomous moral agency, rendering ethical discourse superficial.

The Problematic Absence of Direct Knowledge of Hell and Heaven

A critical concern arises from the lack of empirical or direct insight into hell or heaven. God provides no preview of these realms, leaving individuals to navigate moral "switches"—decisions or actions that purportedly determine transcendent outcomes—without precise guidance. One might face eternal torment for selecting option B over A, due to ambiguous or unforeseen consequences. This opacity appears cynical and arbitrary, suggesting a divine system that withholds essential information, thereby complicating claims of just moral accountability.

Moral Values Tied Exclusively to Afterlife Consequences

In Thomism, the moral valence of actions, functions, and purposes is inextricably linked to their eschatological outcomes. An act is deemed morally bad solely because it leads to hell, not due to intrinsic properties. This consequentialist framing reduces ethics to a calculus of eternal reward or punishment, devoid of independent normative weight. If hell is the sole metric of evil, morality becomes contingent on afterlife mechanics rather than inherent human goods.

Revaluation of Hell: Reasons to Prefer It

If one desires hell, a profound revaluation occurs, inverting traditional moral hierarchies. Beyond compassion for Satan—viewed as a pure spirit damned by an irreversible error—or disdain for perceived ecclesiastical hypocrisy, power obsession, and detachment from worldly realities, two Thomistic principles suggest hell as a viable anti-ecclesial destination:

Existence in Hell Surpasses Non-Existence: Thomists assert that being in hell is infinitely preferable to annihilation. A divine "thread" of existence sustains life there, albeit tenuously extended. This connection to God persists; severing it would result in complete separation and non-being. Thus, hell preserves a minimal ontological link to the divine, rendering it superior to oblivion.

Hell's Role in Perfecting Heaven: Inhabitants of hell contribute to heavenly perfection, as per Thomistic doctrine. Hell is not a locus of evil—evil being mere absence of good—but a participatory element in the greater good. As a place integral to cosmic order, hell enhances divine completeness.

Inverting Morality: Why Avoid Evil?

This revaluation upends morality: if hell perfects heaven and offers existence over nothingness, why deem earthly evil reprehensible? Actions leading to hell become neutral or even desirable, challenging the imperative to pursue good. Thomism's ethical structure collapses under this scrutiny, as moral values lose absolute grounding.

Conclusion

Grace, predestination, and the afterlife introduce irresolvable tensions in Thomism, eroding free will and moral clarity. The absence of direct eschatological knowledge, consequentialist valuation, and potential desirability of hell invert ethical norms, questioning the framework's coherence. Without addressing these, Thomistic ethics risks fideistic reliance over rational justification.

Critique of Edward Feser's Thomism as Absolute Pantheism and Related Concepts

Edward Feser's Aristotelian-Thomistic framework in The Last Superstition inadvertently aligns with Parmenidean monism, portraying God as undifferentiated Being. This critique examines Thomism's pantheistic implications, the inadequacies of key concepts like "being" and "potentiality," and challenges to simultaneous causality, drawing on historical philosophical perspectives.

Thomism as Absolute Pantheism

Feser's progression from Parmenides to Aquinas circles back to Eleatic teachings. Parmenides posits a solitary, undifferentiated, unchanging Being, with plurality and change as illusions. Feser describes Aquinas's God similarly:

The qualities of the Thomistic God are actually only different ways of referring to what is in itself the same thing, Being Itself. (Edward Feser)

While Parmenides deems multiplicity illusory, Feser calls worldly entities "fragmented and imperfect reflections." Schopenhauer summarizes Eleatic philosophy:

The Eleatic philosophers are probably the first who became aware of the opposition between what is intuited and what is thought, phainomena and nooumena. The latter alone was for them true being, the ontôs on. Of this they then asserted that it is One, unchangeable and immovable. They did not claim the same of the phainomena, i.e. of what is intuited, appearing, empirically given, which would have been outright ridiculous. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 1)

Parmenides denies plurality and change; Thomism renders the world ontically illusory, lacking independent existence. Empirical and introspective experiences suggest intrinsic self-motion, yet Thomism denies it:

Only God is in the strictest sense really doing or actualizing anything. (Edward Feser)

This reduces creatures to puppets, animated by divine action, implying self-deception in moral accountability.

Critique of the Concept of "Being"

The term "being" as God's essence is vacuous. Schopenhauer critiques abstract concepts:

[A] concept [...] has a sphere, which is the totality of everything conceivable through the concept. Now the higher the level of abstraction, the more is lost, and therefore the less is thought. The highest, i.e., the most general concepts, are the emptiest and poorest; ultimately these are just empty shells, as, e.g., being, essence, thing, becoming, etc. (Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason)

Religious projections fill this abstraction. The verb "to be" is ambiguous (predication, identity, existence), yielding no coherent divine essence. Anthony Kenny rejects it:

Feser believes that the various arguments of Aquinas establish the existence of a God whose essence is to exist. That this is a nonsensical notion was briskly shown many years ago by a philosopher for whom Feser, rightly, has a great admiration. Peter Geach, in Three Philosophers, imagines the following dialogue: Theist: “There is a God”. Atheist: “So you say: but what sort of being is this God of yours?”. Theist: “Why, I’ve just told you! There is a God; that’s what God is!”. (Anthony Kenny, We Have All Been Here Before)
The Impersonal God

An impersonal God lacks theism's essence. Schopenhauer argues:

However, even the assumption of a cause different from the world is still not theism. This requires not only a cause different from the world, but an intelligent, that is, knowing and willing, thus personal, and hence individual cause of the world; only such a cause is designated by the word God. An impersonal God is no God at all, but merely a misused word, a non-concept, a contradiction in terms, a shibboleth for professors of philosophy... (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 1)

And:

Attempts to purify theism of anthropomorphism, while imagining that they touch only the shell, in reality strike at its innermost essence; by trying to conceive their object in the abstract, they sublimate it into a vague hazy form whose contour, in the attempt to avoid the human form, gradually dissolves completely... (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 1)

For personality is a phenomenon that we know only through our animal nature and that, therefore, separated from this nature, cannot be clearly conceived. To make such a phenomenon the origin and principle of the world is invariably a proposition that not everyone is readily able to grasp; much less can such a proposition be rooted and live in everyone’s mind naturally. On the other hand, an impersonal God is a mere philosophy professor’s fib, a contradiction in terms, an empty word to satisfy the unreflecting or to appease the police spies. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 1)

Potentiality and Its Critiques

Aristotle's potentiality counters Parmenides and Heraclitus, but remains abstract. Questions arise: Does potentiality exist transcendently or immanently? Heraclitus might query its motionlessness; Parmenides, its causal activity.

Bertrand Russell critiques:

The concept of potentiality is convenient in some connections, provided it is so used that we can translate our statements into a form in which the concept is absent... But when potentiality is used as a fundamental and irreducible concept, it always conceals confusion of thought. Aristotle's use of it is one of the bad points in his system. (Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy)

Fritz Mauthner mocks:

Aristotle was the first to teach how to play catch-ball with the notion of potentiality. If the potential is actual or active, then certainly the whole scholastic system is acquitted on the charge of senselessness, and all teleology as well has a great meaning. (Fritz Mauthner, Aristotle)

Aristotle's potentiality may not resolve Zeno's paradoxes, merely relocating them.
Simultaneous Causality

Feser's insistence on simultaneous causality faces challenges when effects are teloi. Sculpting precedes the finished sculpture; complexity requires time.

Schopenhauer addresses:

According to the laws of causality and motivation, the ground must precede the consequent in time. This is absolutely essential... The absurd assertion of many professors of philosophy of our day that cause and effect are simultaneous can again be refuted by the fact that in cases where on account of its great rapidity the succession cannot be perceived at all, we nevertheless assume it with a priori certainty... (Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason)

And:

On the other hand, the absurd assertion that cause and effect are simultaneous appears moreover from the following consideration. An unbroken chain of causes and effects fills the whole of time... Now if every effect were simultaneous with its cause, then every effect would be moved up into the time of its cause... Therefore, on the assumption that cause and effect are simultaneous, the course of the world shrinks up into the business of a moment. (Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2)

A blogger notes:

Using Aristotle, Feser also denies temporal causality in favor of simultaneous causality... The brick is clearly thrown before hitting the glass and its impact on the window causes the glass to shatter... For a window, the glass will bend slightly inward from the impact of the brick before shattering under the pressure. (Atheism and the City)

Trick Slattery differentiates accidental (temporal) and essential (simultaneous) causality, critiquing misuse in free will debates:

Essential causality... entails the generalized grouping of a pile of accidental causes... Even if we accept the idea of essential causality, that does not mean that something didn’t cause the builder building house/house being built in the first place... I’m also not a fan of the words “accidental” and “essential” to describe these different types of causes. Today, such words are way too ambiguous... (Trick Slattery, Breaking the Free Will Illusion for the Betterment of Humankind)

Conclusion

Feser's Thomism echoes Parmenidean monism, with "being" as a vacuous abstraction and an impersonal God lacking theistic essence. Potentiality remains critiqued as confusing, and simultaneous causality fails to account for temporal processes. These elements render Thomism pantheistic, undermining its distinctions from Eleatic philosophy.

Critique of Edward Feser's Grasping of Universals, the Soul, and the Questionability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy

Edward Feser's Aristotelian-Thomistic framework in The Last Superstition posits that universals are grasped through intellectual abstraction of forms from sensory experience. However, this process raises profound epistemological and ontological issues, including the potential for error, dualistic implications, and reliance on naïve realism. This critique explores these challenges, contrasts Aristotelian and Baconian methodologies, and questions the overall viability of the philosophy, drawing on historical critiques.


Grasping Universals and the Soul

Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy suggests that brief observation of an object yields its complete concept in the mind or soul, akin to telepathic transfer. The concept, identical to the object's ontological form, ostensibly allows extraction of all essential information without further inspection.

Yet, this invites questions: How are conceptual errors possible? If an incomplete or false concept resides in the mind, does it reflect a fragmented form? Can forms be remodeled arbitrarily, or fragments assembled into useless wholes? Without assurance of completeness and accuracy, what advantages does this theory hold over alternatives?

Examining a dog yields its form—the dog's soul or life principle—in the intellectual soul. This implies creating an unmaterialized canine principle ex nihilo or mystically uniting with the dog's form, granting knowledge of universal "dogness." Such union risks bodily damage, as the dog form might seek materialization, disrupting the hylomorphic unity of intellectual soul and body.

Matter's potential back-action on the soul suggests Cartesian dualism. Boris Hennig argues Aristotle and Descartes converge:

When Descartes calls the mind an immaterial substance, he seems to break with the Aristotelian tradition... I will show that in both respects, Descartes does not differ as radically from Aristotle (and Aquinas) as one might suppose. (Boris Hennig, The Inner Man as Substantial Form)

Hennig concludes Aristotle's substantial form aligns with Descartes's mind, blurring distinctions.

Observing a tadpole without prior knowledge: Does one intuit the frog form, or await metamorphosis? This implies ad hoc justification.

Intensive study of a tree requires repeated observation for essential details; without it, speculation ensues. Aristotle's confidence in scientific statements reflects overreliance on abstraction:

There is no quality more noticeable in [Aristotle] than his unhesitating confidence in the adequacy of the human mind to comprehend the universe. (Fritz Mauthner, Aristotle)

Yet, Aristotle erred frequently.

Epistemological and Ontological Issues

Aristotle requires imagery for thought: "The soul never thinks without an image" (De Anima III.7, 431a16-17, trans. David Ross). Concepts thus form from fantasy images, not direct abstraction—elegant, but un-Aristotelian.

Sense-perception, essential to grasping forms, depends on physical processes. Aristotle's color transmission is unclear:

[Aristotle's] account of the transmission of colour from the external object to the eye is very difficult to understand. (J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher)

Naïve realism assumes objects appear as perceived, ignoring cognitive apparatus. Schopenhauer's On Vision and Colours deems color subjective retinal activity. Modern science concurs:

We think of color as a fundamental quality of the world around us. But in the outside world, color doesn’t actually exist. Color is an interpretation of wavelengths, one that only exists internally. (David Eagleman, The Brain)

The brain generates its own reality, even before it receives information coming in from the eyes and the other senses. This is known as the internal model. (David Eagleman, The Brain)

Aristotle's examples (e.g., hairiest head for brain protection, Parts of Animals II.14.658b2; eyebrows/eyelashes as shields, II.15.658b14) reflect outdated assumptions.

Unborn fetuses lack developed brains/senses, delaying form grasping. This challenges naïve realism, untenable post-Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Schopenhauer, and modern sciences.
Concept Formation and Immortality

Aristotelian-Thomism denies animal precursors to concepts, ensuring human soul immortality. Animals are purely nominalistic; yet, evidence suggests instinct-guided pre-concepts.

Averroists, Aristotelian, posited one immortal divine intellect, denying individual soul immortality. Aquinas's refutation fails; Averroism persists as alternative.

Linguistic conditions need not invoke universal realism; nominalism or Wittgensteinian language-games suffice.

Bacon vs. Aristotle: Methodological Contrast

Schopenhauer contrasts:

The error of Aristotle... lay in the assumption that they really possessed all truth already... in certain propositions a priori... Bacon showed quite rightly that those axioms did not possess such content... universal and true propositions... had to be gained first through induction. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 1)

The scholastics... thought: First we want to establish the universal... Bacon... said: We want first to get to know the particular things as completely as possible; then we will in the end come to know what the thing in general is. (Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 1)

Bacon's inductive path, prioritizing particulars, should dominate scientific/philosophical inquiry over Aristotle's deduction.

The Questionability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy

Feser's lament over modernity's Aristotelian departure ignores deliberate Platonic revival in humanism and cosmology. Consensus favors Plato over Aristotle, critiqued for anti-linguistic philosophy, epistemological naïveté, and outdated science.

Thomism's theological value contrasts philosophical limitations: negative expressions, unclear representations, semantic stipulations. Schopenhauer deems it wordplay:

[A] conglomeration of... unproven assertions plucked out of the air, and at the same time... artificial subtleties... laboured combinations... (Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2)

Mere words, which are really only soap bubbles... (Arthur Schopenhauer)

Anthony Kenny notes:

[Aquinas's doctrines]... cannot wholly succeed in acquitting them of the charge of sophistry and illusion. (Anthony Kenny, Aquinas)

As a philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas is both overvalued and undervalued... (Anthony Kenny, Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, Introduction)

Between Boethius and Bacon there was hardly a philosopher prepared to write for amateurs and gentlemen. Even in comparison with other medieval writers, Aquinas is difficult for a philosopher to read. (Anthony Kenny, Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, Introduction)