Completing Kant's ethical approach

Completing Kant’s Ethical Approach: The Contribution of Gerold Prauss

Introduction

Gerold Prauss (born May 25, 1936), a distinguished German philosopher, has substantially refined Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory, making it more coherent and compelling. In my view, Prauss has developed what may be considered one of the most persuasive ethical systems to date. His aim is to establish a universal ethical norm—a standard that transcends cultural boundaries and can serve as a lasting guide for the shared cultural evolution of humanity.

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Kant’s Ethical Breakthrough—and Its Limitations

The foundation for such a universal ethical standard lies with Kant. Prior to his work, one could argue that no truly convincing, secular, and objective moral framework existed. Kant’s famous imperative—that every person must be treated not merely as a means to an end but always also as an end in themselves—became a cornerstone of the secular Enlightenment in Europe.

However, as Prauss argues, Kant does not adequately explain why human beings are to be regarded as ends in themselves. Kant’s perspective remains too narrowly focused on the moral agent. According to Prauss, ethics and law must not be understood solely from the standpoint of the one acting; they must also incorporate the perspective of the person being acted upon. In this sense, morality and law are not solipsistic endeavors—they are fundamentally interpersonal.

Kant maintains that moral action consists in treating someone both as a means and as an end, whereas evil lies in treating someone only as a means. But why not define moral goodness in a more intuitively compelling way—namely, as treating someone only as an end, with no element of instrumentalization at all?

Prauss's Clarification of Kant’s Imperative

This is where Prauss introduces a critical distinction. As summarized in the following quote:

“The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between ‘not merely as a means, but at the same time as end’ and ‘not as means at all, but only as end’. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral.”
(Herder.de, 2010)

Three Modes of Interpersonal Treatment

Prauss identifies three possible ways of dealing with other people:

1. Only as a means – This is the epitome of evil: e.g., lying, cheating, stealing, assault, or murder.
2. As both a means and an end – This characterizes legal and everyday interactions: e.g., commercial exchanges, services, cooperation. Here, a person knowingly and willingly participates in a mutual transaction, consenting to being treated in a certain way.
3. Only as an end in itself – This applies in cases where a person is no longer capable of helping themselves, such as after an accident. In such moments, it becomes morally impermissible to ignore them. The injured person remains an end in themselves—because they have the capacity for self-consciousness—even if they cannot presently exercise it. As such, they make a demand on us simply by being present, and failing to help them would constitute a moral failing, perhaps even evil.

The parable of the Good Samaritan, as cited by Prauss, exemplifies this ethical obligation.

The Moral Ought and Interpersonal Demands

According to Prauss, the foundation of ethics lies in self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Only beings capable of recognizing themselves as ends in themselves—and of recognizing others as such—can enter into moral or legal relationships.

Stones and flies are not ends in themselves. We don’t feel morally compelled to save a fly or refrain from stepping on it—unless, hypothetically, the fly were to attain reflective self-awareness. In that case, we might begin to feel a moral hesitation. This illustrates that the moral imperative arises from a being’s capacity for self-knowledge and communication.

Prauss argues that the moral status of a person—as an end in themselves—makes it inherently wrong to treat them only as a means. Each of us knows what it means to be an end in ourselves. And once we recognize this capacity in others, their demands have normative force. This intersubjective recognition grounds our moral obligations.

Importantly, morality is not some eternal Platonic ideal. It arises in concrete encounters between rational beings. Every self-conscious agent is, at the same time, a claim—a source of potential imperatives for others.

The decisive moral criterion, then, is whether the other person can still help themselves. If not, the imperative to help becomes binding.

Deriving the “Ought”: From Will to Obligation

Prauss offers a compelling derivation of the practical ought:

A practical ought arises only in relation to another person’s will. It is essentially the result of an encounter between subjects, each of whom, as a conscious end in itself, is also a conscious willing and demanding being.

The German verb sollen (to “ought to”) presupposes another personal will behind the obligation. For example, when I say, “I ought to take two pills a day,” this typically means, “My doctor wants me to take two pills a day.” The ought stems from someone else's authority or request.

The key ethical question is: How do we distinguish a morally binding ought from one that is merely advisory or optional?

Prauss provides a clear criterion: The ought becomes morally binding when the other person’s survival or fundamental well-being is at stake—when the failure to act would amount to allowing their death or serious harm. Crucially, the injured party’s demand must be proportionate to their injury; no moral claim can go beyond that.

Even when the other person can no longer speak, their very presence as a conscious being—an end in itself—implies a demand. And that demand creates a moral obligation.

Moral vs. Hypothetical Imperatives

Prauss distinguishes between two types of normativity:

1. Moral/legal normativity – arising from the will of another rational being.
2. Instrumental (logical) normativity – arising from one’s own will and goals (e.g., “If I want to be home by 10, I must catch the bus at 9:30.”)

The first is interpersonal and moral. The second is internal and goal-oriented, but not moral in itself.

To illustrate, Prauss’s approach stands in contrast to ethical frameworks such as karma in Eastern philosophy, which offers only hypothetical imperatives: “If you want good karma, do good.” These are conditional, not categorical commands.

For Prauss, morality emerges when an external will makes a demand upon us, and we are in a position to fulfill it. The ought is not an abstract command, but a concrete relational imperative that arises from intersubjective recognition.

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Conclusion

Gerold Prauss brings Kantian ethics to a new level by grounding moral normativity in interpersonal recognition and the mutual understanding of each other as ends in themselves. His theory clarifies the logic of the categorical imperative and offers a more nuanced account of when and why moral obligations arise. By distinguishing between legal, moral, and instrumental norms, he provides a comprehensive ethical framework rooted in rational intersubjectivity.

 

Further Clarification: Pavlos Kontos on Prauss’ Ethical Theory

To further aid understanding, Pavlos Kontos provides a helpful summary of Gerold Prauss’s approach in a 2009 review for Kant-Studien. The following passages, though complex, offer valuable insights:

“The author [Prauss] is inspired by a highly original idea: instead of following Kant’s classic threefold distinction between actions ‘from duty’, ‘in accordance with duty’, and ‘contrary to duty’, he proposes a different triadic schema. This new model remains within the Kantian framework but was never formulated by Kant himself. It distinguishes between actions that treat a person (1) only as a means, (2) not merely as a means but also as an end, and (3) only as an end in themselves. The brilliance of this reconstruction lies in introducing the third, pure form—which has been largely overlooked not only by Kant but also by subsequent Kantian scholarship.”

Kontos notes that even Kant’s original tripartite distinction is widely acknowledged to be problematic. Prauss, by contrast, offers a more elegant and systematic alternative. The traditional categories—‘from’, ‘according to’, and ‘contrary to’ duty—are criticized for being too closely tied to the notion of duty and for not being mutually exclusive. For example, an action not contrary to duty could still be either in accordance with duty or from duty, which leads to conceptual ambiguities.

Prauss argues that Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative in the “formula of humanity”—to treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means—ultimately risks collapsing morality and legality into one. Hence his bold assertion:

“To confuse morality with right is a catastrophe.” (p. 707)

Moral Good vs. Legal Right

Prauss clarifies this confusion by assigning distinct ethical meanings to the three modalities of action:

• “Only as a means” – defines both morally and legally evil action.
• “As both a means and an end” – defines lawful or right action in a reciprocal legal relationship.
• “Only as an end” – defines truly moral action, where the other person’s vulnerability demands a response grounded solely in their dignity.

Morality, in this sense, is limited to situations in which a person is no longer capable of helping themselves. Such a situation gives rise to a unique moral claim—a demand grounded not in reciprocity, but in asymmetry. As Prauss puts it: morality only arises when the individual in question “is precisely not in a position to help himself, and as long as he remains in this position” (p. 711). Self-help thus becomes the decisive criterion for distinguishing between morality and right.

This implies two additional conclusions: First, there can be no morality between persons who are not in need—only legality. Second, there can be no morality between persons who are both in need, as neither can enter into a relation of giving. Morality thus presupposes an asymmetrical relationship between a capable subject and a dependent one—like the Samaritan and the wounded traveler.

Normativity as a Response to the Other

Prauss reconstructs the concept of an "end in itself" through an extended argument that Kontos summarizes as follows:

Human will is not self-contained—it is inherently oriented toward the success of the actions in which it is involved. Because of this directedness, good and evil are attributes of actions insofar as they conform to the kind of normativity the agent has freely internalized. Every form of normativity presupposes (1) a claim or demand from the patient (the one affected by the action) and (2) a willingness on the part of the agent to act in accordance with the principles he has endorsed.

Freedom acquires moral significance only when it becomes the object of conscious reflection. Mere possession of freedom is not enough; it must be thematized—recognized and reflected upon. This requires not just understanding (Verstand) but reason (Vernunft). Through reason, human beings achieve self-recognition as free agents—creators of ends.

Thus, the first form of causality that a rational being becomes aware of is free causality, as the vehicle of self-realization. Only subsequently does the individual recognize other forms of causality—whether natural or intersubjective.

Prauss concludes:

“Free causality constitutes from the outset the necessary precondition of natural causality.” (p. 865)

Life, Time, and the Modalities of Action

Prauss then synthesizes the relationship between freedom (self-realization) and necessity (the demands of others) in three ethical modalities:

1. Only as a means – “life to take”
2. As a means and an end – “life to take and to give”
3. Only as an end – “life to give”

If we replace “life” with “lifetime” (Geistesleben or conscious life), the implications become clear: Lifetime cannot be measured, increased, regained, or exchanged. It resists quantification and, for that reason, becomes the foundation of moral value. Good and evil are thus non-instrumental categories—independent of utility or outcomes.

Grounding ethics in transcendental conditions—self-awareness and interpersonality—allows us to resist utilitarianism. For Prauss, these are facts, but facts that carry formal significance: they cannot be reduced or derived from anything else, and yet they ground both the being and the sense of morality and law.

Final Implications

In conclusion, morality and right are not abstract principles or subjective intentions, but arise as objective demands in the context of interpersonal relations. Good and evil are predicates of actions that affect the lifetime of others. Moral action is not about purity of intent, but about how we engage with others as vulnerable ends in themselves.

 

Possible Objections and Rejoinders (Revised)

1. The Problem of Moral Dilemmas

Critics often argue that moral dilemmas demonstrate the non-existence of a categorical imperative. Consider this example:

“You witness a bank robbery. The thief donates the stolen money to a starving orphanage. If you report the crime, the money will be returned to the bank, and the children will go hungry again. What should you do?”
(Buzzfeed)

This scenario appears to pit one moral imperative (reporting a crime) against another (not letting children starve). The implication: a single, absolute imperative like Kant’s (or Prauss’s) fails in the face of such conflicting duties.

But this conclusion is hasty. The moral complexity of the situation does not refute the existence of a categorical imperative; rather, it reveals the difficulty of identifying who exactly bears the obligation to help. According to Prauss’s framework, both failing to report a crime (using others as a means) and failing to help those in desperate need (ignoring ends in themselves) are wrong.

What remains is the question of responsibility: Who is morally called upon to help the children now? That may be difficult to determine, but it doesn’t negate the core idea: the starving children remain ends in themselves and must be helped.

2. The Samaritan Problem Extended

Another objection asks: if I’m morally obligated to help one person in need today, must I help a new person tomorrow, and the day after, and every day for the rest of my life?

According to Prauss, the answer is nuanced. You are only obligated to help when:

• You encounter a person in immediate need, and
• You are in a position to help without extreme personal sacrifice

The duty arises situationally and is not an infinite demand to become a moral saint. If you find someone injured every day near your home, perhaps the moral response is no longer just to help them individually but to investigate the underlying causes—a systemic moral duty may arise. Still, your obligation depends on awareness, capacity, and proximity, not on an infinite series of duties piling up.

3. On the Nature of Moral Obligation

Critics often confuse moral obligation with mere repetition or personal fatigue. But helping on the 21st day isn’t morally required because you helped on the 20 days before. Rather, it's because a new moral situation has arisen again today. Past good deeds don’t negate current obligations when someone is again helpless before you.

Prauss’s ethics are grounded not in idealized maxims, but in real interpersonal situations where a person is genuinely unable to help themselves. That makes morality concrete, bounded, and situational—not infinite or utopian.

4. Do Imperatives Even Exist?

Skeptics may question whether any moral imperatives exist at all. But imperatives—commands or requests from others—clearly do exist. If I ask you to go for a walk, I issue an imperative. The real issue is distinguishing morally binding imperatives from optional ones.

Prauss offers a plausible criterion: an imperative becomes morally binding when it comes from someone who is an end in themselves and unable to help themselves. This combination creates a real, objective demand—not just a subjective wish.

5. Degrees of Help: What Counts?

Does helping always require personal intervention? Not necessarily. Calling an ambulance may be enough. Helping is measured by capacity and context, not by heroic sacrifice. The moral standard is: do what you can, to the best of your knowledge and conscience.

If someone is always in need near your home, moral awareness may require more than action—it may require structural attention or even communal involvement.

6. Are We Obligated to Leave the House?

Another objection: if need is potentially infinite, does morality require constant vigilance—even leaving home in search of suffering?

Prauss’s theory says no. Moral duties arise from concrete situations, not from hypothetical ones. You’re not obligated to search for suffering. However, if you become aware of persistent suffering in your environment, a situational duty may arise to investigate or contribute to preventing it.

7. What About Global Suffering?

If I learn that people are starving in another country—am I morally obligated to help?

This is a harder question, and Prauss’s framework doesn’t offer a simple formula. It invites questions of proximity, agency, and shared responsibility. Perhaps I am called to donate. Perhaps to advocate politically. But the core point remains: the moral significance of the suffering itself is not diminished just because it's far away.

8. What About Suicide?

What if someone wants to end their life? Are they morally wrong for giving up, rather than living on to help others?

According to Prauss, morality arises in asymmetrical relationships: between someone capable of helping and someone in need. A dying person is no longer capable of self-help and thus no longer in a position to help others. Morality, as Prauss defines it, doesn’t demand sainthood or self-sacrifice unto death. It requires the reasonable use of one's available power—one’s lifetime—as a resource for others when it makes sense to do so.

9. Universal Need Doesn’t Invalidate the Theory

It’s tempting to argue that “everyone needs help”, and thus the idea of "someone in need" becomes meaningless. But this overgeneralization misses the point: Prauss’s criterion is based on actual incapacity for self-help—not on vague, subjective feelings of need.

A person who is depressed but functioning is different from someone who is physically incapable of moving after an accident. Prauss’s model is grounded in observable, situational incapacity, not inner suffering alone.

10. On Suffering and Its Evaluation

Not all suffering is equal. Some people bear great pain with grace; others complain despite comfort. Prauss’s theory doesn’t pretend to measure inner pain directly, but focuses on the objective condition of being unable to help oneself. It sidesteps the impossible task of ranking pain by emphasizing moral obligation only in cases of evident helplessness.

11. The Limit of the Samaritan Example

Prauss bases his theory largely on one example: the Good Samaritan. This is intentional. The Samaritan sees a person near death who cannot help himself. That’s enough to trigger a moral demand.

Other cases—such as global poverty, suicide, or chronic suffering—are less clear-cut and must be evaluated individually. That doesn’t make them morally irrelevant, but it does mean moral imperatives are situational, not abstract and fixed.

12. Summary of the Ethical Framework

One could describe Prauss’s ethics as a form of patient-centered deontology. The moral duty arises from the rights of the other—especially their right not to be used solely as a means, and, more radically, their right to be treated solely as an end when they are incapable of self-help.

This focus on interpersonal asymmetry gives Prauss’s ethics both moral clarity and practical grounding. Unlike Kant, who anchors duty in the agent's rational self-legislation, Prauss roots it in the vulnerable presence of the other—a presence that speaks, even without words, the imperative: Help me.